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In the few days prior to 8 May 2010, European coun-
try leaders noticed a rapid loss of market confidence
in government bonds. This loss of confidence not only
affected bonds issued by the Greek government but
also government bonds of several other member
countries in the eurozone. The default insurance pre-
mium on government bonds picked up rapidly for sev-
eral countries, indicating that the market participants
had revised their expectations about these govern-
ments’ ability and/or willingness to honour their out-
standing debt. 
Country leaders reacted. Within two days they con-
structed what is known as the 750 billion euro rescue
device. It consisted of the EFSF, the EFSM and addi-
tional guarantees provided through the International
Monetary Fund. In hindsight, some policy makers
admit that the initial idea was that a European
promise of support of this size would be sufficient to
re-establish confidence among market participants.
The hope may have been that market participants
return to their prior expectations about government
bonds of members of the eurozone: holding these
bonds are perfectly safe assets, with bonds of different
countries being almost perfect substitutes for each
other. 
Now, one year later, it is evident: their policy went
completely wrong. In addition to the 110 billion euro
rescue package for Greece, the governments of
Portugal and Ireland had to be rescued. They
received considerable financial aid from the rescue
device, and other countries like Spain or Italy are
candidates that may follow. And the insurance premi-
ums for many of the relevant countries – including
the ones rescued – are higher in May 2011 than they
were in May 2010.
Officially, Greece was supposed to return to the pri-
vate capital market after a period of no more than
three years. But rather than an improvement in credit
worthiness, during the last 12 months we have seen a
process of deterioration. Rather than preparing for a
return to the private capital markets, Greece entered
into debt renegotiations about prolonging the help
and easing the debt burden further. There is seeming-
ly almost a consensus that Greece cannot reach a
financially healthy situation without either a partial
devaluation of its debt in the process of a default fol-
lowed by a debt restructuring, or massive foreign
transfers. 
It is difficult to admit a mistake, in particular a mis-
take of this size. Not surprisingly the policy reaction
to the failure is not a change of direction, but rather:
‘what we did was right, but it was not enough’.
Projecting this behaviour into the future, a likely
direction of European policy is a speedy integration
of fiscal policy inside the eurozone. First steps in this
direction took place. We see the modifications of the
Stability and Growth Pact that include a view on
macroeconomic imbalances in member countries, the
intensified reporting and benchmarking in the context
of the ‘European Semester’ and of the ‘Euro Plus’
agreements as part of this process. These instruments
clearly strengthen the position of the European
Commission inside the European Union, expand on
existing tasks and allocate new tasks to the bureau-
cracy of the European Commission. 
We are doubtful whether these steps will cure the
European government debt crisis. It is very likely that,
given these steps, the problems will persist and may
even grow further. At some point in the near future
policy makers in the eurozone will have to take further
steps. 
As we emphasized (Konrad and Zschäpitz 2010)
already at the brink of introduction of the rescue
device in May 2010, there are several, very different
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policy options. One option is a complete reversal of
the steps towards socialized fiscal responsibility that
have been taken in the last months and a return to a
status of national fiscal responsibility. This step
implies that some member countries that suffer from
a severe fiscal imbalance are likely to face the prospect
of a debt restructuring, whereas others may need to
take very painful steps to return to sound public
finances. As pointed out by Reinhart and Sbrancia
(2011), ‘financial repression’ may be one policy
options taken by the latter.1 Politics wasted very valu-
able time which they had bought for themselves by the
rescue device in May 2010 so far. Policy makers in
Europe could still use the time window that exists.
Along this way, they need to make the banking system
in Europe and the financial markets more generally
sufficiently resilient and robust to sustain such a peri-
od of crisis. We emphasized this as a necessity from
the beginning of the crisis (Konrad and Zschäpitz
2010), and the Council of Scientific Advisors to the
Federal Ministry of Finance in Germany (2010) fol-
lowed a very similar line of reasoning. 
This policy would, among other things, require a
strong separation of the banking system and the busi-
ness of financing government debt. The fact that pri-
vate banks own considerable shares in European gov-
ernment bonds and risk a major share of their equity
in this market makes a restructuring more difficult
than otherwise. We understand why, under current
conditions, banks have an interest in investing their
assets in government bonds. Under current regula-
tion, they need less equity to finance such investments
than if they hand out loans to medium-size enterpris-
es. This clearly is like a subsidy by which the govern-
ments distort banking decisions, making banks more
inclined to finance government debt than engage in
their core business. And from the perspective of polit-
ical economy, this type of subsidy is not difficult to
understand. But from the perspective of economy
wide efficiency, we do not see a convincing reason why
banks should use (or should even be stimulated to
use) their own funds to invest it in government bonds.
They should leave this business to insurance compa-
nies, pension funds and small private investors and
should turn to their core business as it is outlined in
the textbooks about banking business.2
As discussed, the political process since 10 May 2010
did not march in this direction, but drifted into the
opposite direction. Many key players inside the euro-
zone seemingly wanted to rule out state bankruptcy
inside the eurozone. Early on, the German Chancellor
considered intergovernmental transfers or financial
aid as the ‘ultima ratio’, where economists would con-
sider a process of default and debt restructuring as the
more adequate ultima ratio. We expect that the politi-
cal process will drift further into this other direction,
essentially further socializing financial responsibility,
and generating a common pool as regards European
government debt. 
European leaders may first try to implement fiscal
sustainability via strengthening supervision and by a
modified enforcement mechanism with sanctions for
excessive government deficits, together with strict con-
ditionality in case a country has to rely on fiscal aid
from the newly installed European Stability
Mechanism. We are convinced that this will not work.
And once these attempts have failed, this could,
directly or indirectly, lead to a dramatic expansion of
the system of financial transfers between the member
countries inside the eurozone or the EU as a whole: a
system in which a constant flow of funds from coun-
tries with sound public finances prevents some other
countries from bankruptcy. 
Such a transfer system exists in a rudimentary version
in the context of the common agricultural policy and
in the context of cohesion funds as part of EU policy.
This argument is frequently used to suggest that a
transfer union is not a dramatic change, compared to
the status quo. But this argument drastically down-
plays such a change. To make this very transparent, it
may be useful to get a feeling for the magnitude of the
fiscal transfers we would observe if we simply scaled a
system such as the system of intergovernmental trans-
fers in Germany between the regions to the European
level. Nobody, as far as we know, proposes such a sys-
tem in the current state of affairs. And this thought
experiment is, of course, not meant as a policy pro-
posal here either. It is meant as an illustration of the
excessively large sums that are at stake if the EU
moved towards a transfers union of any kind. 
The German federal transfer system aims at a strong
reduction in the interregional differences in govern-
mental revenue per capita. Loosely speaking, and sub-
ject to some more specific rules, this system takes from
those states who obtain tax revenues per capita that
are above average in Germany, and reduces the differ-
1 Reinhard and Sbrancia (2011) use this term to describe regulatory
government interventions that essentially force lower than market
interest rates or even negative real interest rates upon some of their
bondholders, with domestic savings by pension funds as one of the
prime target groups.
2 This is not an argument against banks working in the business of
securitization or as intermediaries in the markets for bonds, which is
very different from the business of using own funds for buying gov-
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ence of states with lower-than-average tax revenues.
The degree of equalization of per-capita tax revenue
between the different states in Germany is above
90 percent. 
Figure 1 shows the public sector revenues (sum of
taxes and social security contributions) on a per-
capita basis for the 27 member states of the
European Union as a percentage of the EU average
for the year 2007, which is the last year that is not
substantially affected by the financial and economic
crisis. This figure shows that the discrepancies
between the member countries are dramatic. For
instance, the public sector revenue in Bulgaria is in
the range of only about 12.6 percent of the EU aver-
age. Consider a transfer mechanism that eventually
redistributes revenues between member countries
that cover only half of the difference between this
actual level and the EU. The revenues of Poland, for
instance, are 27.8 percent of the EU average. If fifty
percent of the deviation from this average is correct-
ed for, Poland would receive half of 72.2 percentage
points. This increases fiscal revenue to 63.9 percent
of the EU average. This transfer would have to be
financed by the countries that have fiscal revenues
above the EU average. For the year 2007 the fiscal
revenue of Germany exceeds that of the EU average
by around 17.6 percent. A transfer mechanism that
simply equalizes 50 percent of the difference from
average, based on 2007 figures, sums up to 445 billion
euros per year. For Germany, for instance, this would
be a contribution of almost 74 billion euros per year,
on the basis of the 2007 figures. 
These numbers were calculated for a transfer mecha-
nism that builds on social security inclusive figures.
One may claim that this is a misleading comparison,
and that one should focus on tax revenues only. This
would reduce the numbers, as on average tax revenues
are only two thirds of the social security inclusive
numbers we used for these rough calculations.
However, this would still be excessively large numbers. 
Evidently, these numbers are not related to any of the
policy proposals that is currently negotiated.
Nevertheless, these numbers are interesting, for sever-
al reasons. These rough calculations show: a transfer
mechanism that achieves little more than half the
amount of equalization in governmental revenues
would have transfers that are magnitudes larger than
the total current EU budget. Currently all EU mem-
ber countries receive back a large share of their con-
tributions to the EU budget via the different EU pro-
grammes. The current net transfers inside the EU are
much smaller than the total EU budget. Accordingly,
the net transfers would be orders of magnitude larger
than the current net transfers between EU member
countries. 
These considerations illustrate: the hint to the fact
that the EU already is a transfer union really down
plays the dimension of the problem. We may also
recall that already the existing net
transfers that are tiny in compar-
ison to the numbers in Figure 1
are the cause of a permanent
struggle inside Europe. It is hard
to believe that Europe could sur-
vive the political antagonisms
that would be created by transfers
of this magnitude. 
Second, implementation of a
transfer system of any kind
would not be a trivial matter.
Any transfer mechanism that
takes from countries with high
tax revenue and gives to those
with little tax revenue generates
considerable incentives inside the
countries for reductions in their
own tax revenues. Leaving the
income in the pockets of their
citizens and receiving tax revenue









































































































































































































With transfer mechanism 
PUBLIC SECTOR REVENUES
a) PER CAPITA AND POSSIBLE TRANSFER 
PAYMENTS
b) IN THE EU27, 2007
Per capita revenues as % of EU average
  Transfer payments per year for
     France            100.7 bn                UK                     78.7 bn                Germany          73.8 bn  
     Sweden            34.2 bn                Italy                    33.2 bn                Netherlands     29.2 bn
     Denmark          28.8 bn                Belgium              23.0 bn                Austria             16.9 bn
     Finland             11.8 bn                Luxembourg         4.4 bn                Cyprus               1.6 bn
a) Taxes plus social security contributions.
b) These amounts are calculated on the basis of a 50 percent equalisation scheme adopting the
following calculations: [the country’s tax revenues including social security contributions per
capita minus EU-average]*[the country’s population size]*[0.5].
Source: Eurostat Unit C5 (Government and sector accounts, Financial indicators); own
calculations.
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nism is seemingly more attractive from a country’s
national point of view than charging own citizens
high taxes and using the tax revenue as transfers to
other countries. And given that tax laws are non-uni-
form across the European Union, the member coun-
tries would have incentives to lower tax rates, or to
abolish a major share of their taxes: low taxes would
benefit their own population directly, and a large
share of the tax revenue sacrificed would be compen-
sated by higher transfers from other member coun-
tries. Accordingly, any substantial inter-country
transfer system of tax revenues could not work with-
out a considerable increase in tax law harmonization.
It would require a further large step toward
‘European integration’. Whether this is really a desir-
able and politically viable option for a future Europe
is a different matter.3
A transfer union of the type described here is clearly
not a desirable perspective. And the massive volume
of transfers is also unlikely to be economically or
politically viable. Although such a transfer union
could be the logical endpoint of the path which
European policy makers are currently pursuing, we
consider a transfer union of this type as unlikely. A
more likely outcome is a breakdown of the eurozone
prior reaching this endpoint. One possible reason for
this breakdown is a raise in political tensions among
member countries. A second, more likely reason is the
bond market’s possible loss of confidence in the sus-
tainability of the whole eurozone. 
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